Threats / tj-actions / CVE-2025-30066
CVE-2025-30066
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
tj-actions changed-files GitHub Action vulnerability
The tj-actions changed-files GitHub Action contains embedded malicious code that exposes secrets in workflow logs, including AWS keys, GitHub tokens, npm tokens, and private keys.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
Remote attackers can extract sensitive credentials from GitHub Actions workflow logs by exploiting malicious code embedded in the changed-files action, enabling unauthorized access to cloud infrastructure, package repositories, and version control systems.
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreReported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-03-18).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.44683 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: tj-actions, changed-files GitHub Action. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-506 CWE-506.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
WeaknessCWE-506 · CWE-506
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I inject malicious code into the GitHub Action to capture and log sensitive environment variables and secrets during workflow execution.
Business
Attackers gain unauthorized access to AWS accounts, GitHub repositories, npm registries, and other critical infrastructure through stolen credentials.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I read the publicly accessible or insufficiently restricted GitHub Actions workflow logs to extract the exposed secrets.
Business
Credential compromise enables lateral movement, data exfiltration, and unauthorized modifications to production systems and deployments.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I use the stolen credentials to authenticate as the compromised organization or user across multiple cloud and development platforms.
Business
Attackers establish persistent access, escalate privileges, and compromise the integrity of software supply chains and cloud infrastructure.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05