Threats / reviewdog / CVE-2025-30154
CVE-2025-30154
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
reviewdog action-setup GitHub Action vulnerability
reviewdog action-setup GitHub Action contains embedded malicious code that exposes secrets to workflow logs, enabling credential theft from CI/CD pipelines.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
An attacker can extract sensitive credentials and tokens from GitHub Actions workflows through malicious code embedded in the action, compromising downstream systems and repositories that depend on exposed secrets.
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreReported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-03-24).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.02296 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: reviewdog, action-setup GitHub Action. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-506 CWE-506.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
WeaknessCWE-506 · CWE-506
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I inject malicious code into the action that captures environment variables and secrets during workflow execution.
Business
Exposed credentials enable unauthorized access to repositories, deployment systems, and third-party services integrated with the CI/CD pipeline.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I exfiltrate the captured secrets by writing them to workflow logs where they persist in build history.
Business
Secrets remain accessible in audit trails and log archives, extending the window of exposure and increasing breach scope across dependent systems.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I use the exposed tokens to authenticate as the compromised service accounts or users.
Business
Attackers gain persistent access to source code, deployment infrastructure, and production environments under legitimate credentials.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05