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Threats / IGEL / CVE-2025-47827
CVE-2025-47827 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

IGEL OS vulnerability

IGEL OS contains a cryptographic signature verification flaw in the igel-flash-driver module that allows Secure Boot bypass via a crafted SquashFS image using an expired key.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An attacker can bypass Secure Boot protections by exploiting improper signature verification in IGEL OS, enabling installation of a malicious root filesystem. This vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-10-143EPSS 0.03528 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-10-14).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.03528 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: IGEL, IGEL OS. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-324 CWE-324 — weakness family: Cryptography.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-324 · CWE-324Cryptography
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious SquashFS image and sign it with an expired cryptographic key that the igel-flash-driver fails to properly validate.
Business
Device integrity controls are circumvented, allowing unauthorized code execution at the boot level.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I bypass Secure Boot mechanisms by mounting my crafted root filesystem during the boot process.
Business
Attackers gain persistent control over endpoint devices with administrative privileges.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish a foothold on IGEL OS systems to deploy malware, steal credentials, or pivot to connected infrastructure.
Business
Enterprise endpoints become compromised, creating data breach and lateral movement risks across the organization.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 5 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.