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Threats / SmarterTools / CVE-2025-52691
CVE-2025-52691 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-07

SmarterTools SmarterMail vulnerability

SmarterMail contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability allowing unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files, potentially enabling remote code execution on mail servers.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit CWE-434 to upload malicious files without restriction, achieving code execution on affected SmarterMail instances. Active exploitation and ransomware campaigns confirm critical risk.

CISA KEV Yes · 2026-01-263Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.8966 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-01-26), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.8966 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: SmarterTools, SmarterMail. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-434 Unrestricted File Upload — weakness family: Path traversal / file.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-434 · Unrestricted File UploadPath traversal / file
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No threat-actor attribution is established from the public feed for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious file and send an HTTP request to the vulnerable upload endpoint without authentication.
Business
The organization's mail server is immediately accessible to external threat actors without credential requirements.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I upload a web shell or executable to an arbitrary location on the server filesystem.
Business
Attackers gain persistent code execution capability within the mail infrastructure.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute commands on the compromised server to establish lateral movement and data exfiltration.
Business
Email data, user credentials, and sensitive communications are exposed to theft and manipulation.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I deploy ransomware payloads across the mail server and connected systems.
Business
Critical business operations halt; ransom demands follow with threat of data publication.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by CSA (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by CSACNA
    Credited with finding itChua Meng Hanfinder