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Threats / WatchGuard / CVE-2025-9242
CVE-2025-9242 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

WatchGuard Firebox vulnerability

WatchGuard Firebox contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the iked process allowing remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A remote code execution vulnerability in WatchGuard Firebox's iked daemon permits unauthenticated exploitation without user interaction. The high EPSS score and active exploitation in the wild indicate immediate risk to deployed instances.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-11-123EPSS 0.8637 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
6 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-11-12).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.8637 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: WatchGuard, Firebox. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write — weakness family: Memory safety.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-787 · Out-of-bounds WriteMemory safety
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious network packet targeting the iked process on the Firebox appliance.
Business
The firewall perimeter defense is compromised, exposing the organization's network boundary to direct adversary control.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I trigger the out-of-bounds write to overwrite memory and inject executable code into the iked process.
Business
The attacker gains code execution with the privileges of the iked daemon, potentially the root or system account.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistent access or pivot to internal network segments behind the compromised firewall.
Business
Internal systems and data become accessible to the attacker, enabling lateral movement and data exfiltration.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 6 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by WatchGuard (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by WatchGuardCNA
    Credited with finding itbtaolfinder