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Threats / TP-Link / CVE-2025-9377
CVE-2025-9377 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

TP-Link Multiple Routers vulnerability

TP-Link Archer C7(EU) and TL-WR841N/ND(MS) routers contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the Parental Control page, allowing remote code execution on affected devices.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

OS command injection in the Parental Control interface enables unauthenticated or low-privileged attackers to execute arbitrary system commands with router privileges, potentially compromising network traffic and connected devices.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-09-033EPSS 0.11747 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
6 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-09-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.11747 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: TP-Link, Multiple Routers. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft malicious input containing shell metacharacters in the Parental Control page parameters to break out of intended command context.
Business
Attacker gains code execution on the router, establishing a persistent foothold in the network perimeter.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I execute system commands to modify firewall rules, DNS settings, or install backdoors for sustained access.
Business
Network traffic becomes subject to interception, redirection, or man-in-the-middle attacks affecting all connected users.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I pivot from the compromised router to attack downstream devices on the local network or exfiltrate sensitive data.
Business
Customer devices and data are exposed to lateral movement and credential harvesting attacks originating from trusted network infrastructure.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 6 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by TPLink (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by TPLinkCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.