G0004 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Ke3chang

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: APT15 Mirage Vixen Panda GREF Playful Dragon RoyalAPT NICKEL Nylon Typhoon — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2019–2024approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignSPACEHOP Activity. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0052.⁶⁰

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo.⁴⁹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.002 Security Account ManagerCredential Access

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T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

●

T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1007 System Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1020 Automated ExfiltrationExfiltration

●

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

●

T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.002 Right-to-Left OverrideDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.004 DNSCommand & Control

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1114.002 Remote Email CollectionCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1213.002 SharepointCollection

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T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1558.001 Golden TicketCredential Access

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1569.002 Service ExecutionExecution

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T1583.005 BotnetResource Development

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1614.001 System Language DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

TasklistS0057 · Tool

ATT&CK S0057 ↗

SysteminfoS0096 · Tool

PingS0097 · Tool

ipconfigS0100 · Tool

netstatS0104 · Tool

spwebmemberS0227 · Tool

ATT&CK S0227 ↗

+3 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to G0004 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0004 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

SPACEHOP Activity — ATT&CK Campaign C0052

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records SPACEHOP Activity (C0052) — roughly 2019–2024 as an operation attributed to this group.⁶⁰

Open ATT&CK C0052 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

46 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

11 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

6 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.