G0007 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT28

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. This group has been active since at least 2004. APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. In 2018, the US…

Attributed to Russia — GRU (85th GTsSS, Unit 26165) by government advisory.¹²³¹²⁴

Also tracked as: IRON TWILIGHT SNAKEMACKEREL Swallowtail Group 74 Sednit Sofacy Pawn Storm Fancy Bear STRONTIUM Tsar Team Threat Group-4127 TG-4127 Forest Blizzard FROZENLAKE GruesomeLarch — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2022–2024approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignAPT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0051.¹²²

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 28 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, CHOPSTICK, Net, JHUHUGIT.⁹⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1001.001 Junk DataCommand & Control

T1003 OS Credential DumpingCredential Access

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T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

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T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1014 RootkitDefense Evasion

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

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T1025 Data from Removable MediaCollection

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T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1030 Data Transfer Size LimitsExfiltration

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T1036 MasqueradingDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1039 Data from Network Shared DriveCollection

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T1040 Network SniffingCredential Access / Discovery

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T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolExfiltration

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T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.006 TimestompDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.003 Mail ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

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T1074.002 Remote Data StagingCollection

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T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop ProxyCommand & Control

T1091 Replication Through Removable MediaInitial Access / Lateral Movement

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T1092 Communication Through Removable MediaCommand & Control

T1098.002 Additional Email Delegate PermissionsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

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T1110.001 Password GuessingCredential Access

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T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

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T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1114.002 Remote Email CollectionCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1120 Peripheral Device DiscoveryDiscovery

T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1134.001 Token Impersonation/TheftPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1137.002 Office TestPersistence

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1199 Trusted RelationshipInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesLateral Movement

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T1211 Exploitation for Defense EvasionDefense Evasion

T1213 Data from Information RepositoriesCollection

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T1213.002 SharepointCollection

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T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1221 Template InjectionDefense Evasion

T1498 Network Denial of ServiceImpact

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T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1528 Steal Application Access TokenCredential Access

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T1542.003 BootkitPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1546.015 Component Object Model HijackingPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1550.001 Application Access TokenDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

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T1550.002 Pass the HashDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

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T1557.004 Evil TwinCredential Access / Collection

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1564.001 Hidden Files and DirectoriesDefense Evasion

T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1567 Exfiltration Over Web ServiceExfiltration

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T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1584.008 Network DevicesResource Development

T1586.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1589.001 CredentialsReconnaissance

T1591 Gather Victim Org InformationReconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability ScanningReconnaissance

T1596 Search Open Technical DatabasesReconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for InformationReconnaissance

T1598.003 Spearphishing LinkReconnaissance

T1669 Wi-Fi NetworksInitial Access

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Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

CHOPSTICKS0023 · Malware

ATT&CK S0023 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

JHUHUGITS0044 · Malware

ATT&CK S0044 ↗

ADVSTORESHELLS0045 · Malware

ATT&CK S0045 ↗

XTunnelS0117 · Malware

ATT&CK S0117 ↗

DowndelphS0134 · Malware

ATT&CK S0134 ↗

HIDEDRVS0135 · Malware

ATT&CK S0135 ↗

+20 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 28 tools/malware to G0007 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0007 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign — ATT&CK Campaign C0051

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign (C0051) — roughly 2022–2024 as an operation attributed to this group.¹²²

Open ATT&CK C0051 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

91 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

28 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

Origin / sponsor (Russia — GRU (85th GTsSS, Unit 26165)) — curated government advisory (cited)

27 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.