G0008 Crimewareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Carbanak

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Carbanak is a cybercriminal group that has used Carbanak malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. Carbanak may be linked to groups tracked separately as Cobalt Group and FIN7 that have also used Carbanak malware.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Anunak — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a financially-motivated operator.

A crimeware classification means the objective is money — access brokering, theft, fraud, or commodity malware. Volume and opportunism over stealth; the path tends to monetize fast. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 4 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Carbanak, netsh.¹²

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 2 — Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or ServiceDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1219 Remote Access ToolsCommand & Control

T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2 — furthest is 2 · Keys to the kingdom. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

CarbanakS0030 · Malware

ATT&CK S0030 ↗

netshS0108 · Tool

ATT&CK S0108 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0008 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

9 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

4 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

6 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.