G0009 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Deep Panda

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda. This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. Some analysts track Deep…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Shell Crew WebMasters KungFu Kittens PinkPanther Black Vine — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 7 tools/malware to this group, including Derusbi, Net, Tasklist, Sakula.¹³

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 3 — Lateral reach — past segmentation. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

●

T1027.005 Indicator Removal from ToolsDefense Evasion

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1218.010 Regsvr32Defense Evasion

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

●

T1546.008 Accessibility FeaturesPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3 — furthest is 3 · Lateral reach. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

DerusbiS0021 · Malware

ATT&CK S0021 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

TasklistS0057 · Tool

ATT&CK S0057 ↗

SakulaS0074 · Malware

ATT&CK S0074 ↗

MivastS0080 · Malware

ATT&CK S0080 ↗

PingS0097 · Tool

ATT&CK S0097 ↗

StreamExS0142 · Malware

ATT&CK S0142 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0009 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

10 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

7 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.