G0022 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT3

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Gothic Panda Pirpi UPS Team Buckeye Threat Group-0110 TG-0110 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including PlugX, SHOTPUT, schtasks, OSInfo.⁴⁷

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

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T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.005 Indicator Removal from ToolsDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.010 Masquerade Account NameDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1069 Permission Groups DiscoveryDiscovery

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078.002 Domain AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain GroupsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1104 Multi-Stage ChannelsCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110.002 Password CrackingCredential Access

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T1136.001 Local AccountPersistence

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1546.008 Accessibility FeaturesPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

PlugXS0013 · Malware

ATT&CK S0013 ↗

SHOTPUTS0063 · Malware

ATT&CK S0063 ↗

schtasksS0111 · Tool

ATT&CK S0111 ↗

OSInfoS0165 · Malware

ATT&CK S0165 ↗

RemoteCMDS0166 · Malware

ATT&CK S0166 ↗

LaZagneS0349 · Tool

ATT&CK S0349 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0022 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

44 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.