G0030 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Lotus Blossom

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: DRAGONFISH Spring Dragon RADIUM Raspberry Typhoon Bilbug Thrip — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 9 tools/malware to this group, including Elise, Emissary, Ping, certutil.²⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop ProxyCommand & Control

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

●

T1134 Access Token ManipulationPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1482 Domain Trust DiscoveryDiscovery

T1539 Steal Web Session CookieCredential Access

●

T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

●

T1560.003 Archive via Custom MethodCollection

●

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

EliseS0081 · Malware

ATT&CK S0081 ↗

EmissaryS0082 · Malware

PingS0097 · Tool

certutilS0160 · Tool

ImpacketS0357 · Tool

AdFindS0552 · Tool

NBTscanS0590 · Tool

SagerunexS1210 · Malware

ATT&CK S1210 ↗

+1 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 9 tools/malware to G0030 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0030 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0030 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

21 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

9 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

6 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.