G0035 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Dragonfly

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16. Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.

Attributed to Russia — FSB (Center 16) by government advisory.⁶⁹

Also tracked as: TEMP.Isotope DYMALLOY Berserk Bear TG-4192 Crouching Yeti IRON LIBERTY Energetic Bear Ghost Blizzard BROMINE — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 10 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Net, Reg.⁵⁹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.002 Security Account ManagerCredential Access

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T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

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T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.010 Masquerade Account NameDefense Evasion

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.002 File Transfer ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain GroupsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

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T1110.002 Password CrackingCredential Access

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1114.002 Remote Email CollectionCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1135 Network Share DiscoveryDiscovery

T1136.001 Local AccountPersistence

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T1187 Forced AuthenticationCredential Access

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T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply ChainInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesLateral Movement

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T1221 Template InjectionDefense Evasion

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1564.002 Hidden UsersDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1584.004 ServerResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1591.002 Business RelationshipsReconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability ScanningReconnaissance

T1598.002 Spearphishing AttachmentReconnaissance

T1598.003 Spearphishing LinkReconnaissance

T1608.004 Drive-by TargetResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

PsExecS0029 · Tool

NetS0039 · Tool

RegS0075 · Tool

Backdoor.OldreaS0093 · Malware

ATT&CK S0093 ↗

Trojan.KaraganyS0094 · Malware

ATT&CK S0094 ↗

netshS0108 · Tool

ATT&CK S0108 ↗

ImpacketS0357 · Tool

ATT&CK S0357 ↗

+2 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 10 tools/malware to G0035 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0035 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0035 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

56 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

10 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

Origin / sponsor (Russia — FSB (Center 16)) — curated government advisory (cited)

14 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.