G0037 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

FIN6

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Magecart Group 6 ITG08 Skeleton Spider TAAL Camouflage Tempest — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 12 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, PsExec, Cobalt Strike.⁴³

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or ServiceDefense Evasion

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolExfiltration

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T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1074.002 Remote Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1102 Web ServiceCommand & Control

T1110.002 Password CrackingCredential Access

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1134 Access Token ManipulationPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1213.006 DatabasesCollection

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1560.003 Archive via Custom MethodCollection

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.003 Spearphishing via ServiceInitial Access

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T1569.002 Service ExecutionExecution

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T1572 Protocol TunnelingCommand & Control

T1573.002 Asymmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

Windows Credential EditorS0005 · Tool

ATT&CK S0005 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

Cobalt StrikeS0154 · Malware

ATT&CK S0154 ↗

More_eggsS0284 · Malware

ATT&CK S0284 ↗

LockerGogaS0372 · Malware

ATT&CK S0372 ↗

FlawedAmmyyS0381 · Malware

ATT&CK S0381 ↗

RyukS0446 · Malware

ATT&CK S0446 ↗

+4 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 12 tools/malware to G0037 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0037 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0037 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

40 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

12 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

6 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.