Threats / Actors / Gamaredon Group

G0047 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Gamaredon Group

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns. In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: IRON TILDEN Primitive Bear ACTINIUM Armageddon Shuckworm DEV-0157 Aqua Blizzard — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including Reg, Ping, Pteranodon, Remcos.⁷³

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1001 Data ObfuscationCommand & Control

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1020 Automated ExfiltrationExfiltration

●

T1021.005 VNCLateral Movement

●

T1025 Data from Removable MediaCollection

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T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.004 Compile After DeliveryDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1027.012 LNK Icon SmugglingDefense Evasion

T1027.015 CompressionDefense Evasion

T1027.016 Junk Code InsertionDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1039 Data from Network Shared DriveCollection

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T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1080 Taint Shared ContentLateral Movement

●

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1090 ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop ProxyCommand & Control

T1091 Replication Through Removable MediaInitial Access / Lateral Movement

●

T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1102 Web ServiceCommand & Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1102.003 One-Way CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

●

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1120 Peripheral Device DiscoveryDiscovery

T1137 Office Application StartupPersistence

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218.005 MshtaDefense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1221 Template InjectionDefense Evasion

T1480 Execution GuardrailsDefense Evasion

T1491.001 Internal DefacementImpact

●

T1497.001 System ChecksDefense Evasion / Discovery

T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1534 Internal SpearphishingLateral Movement

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1559.001 Component Object ModelExecution

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T1561.001 Disk Content WipeImpact

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1568 Dynamic ResolutionCommand & Control

T1568.001 Fast Flux DNSCommand & Control

T1571 Non-Standard PortCommand & Control

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1587.003 Digital CertificatesResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1608.001 Upload MalwareResource Development

T1620 Reflective Code LoadingDefense Evasion

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

RegS0075 · Tool

ATT&CK S0075 ↗

PingS0097 · Tool

ATT&CK S0097 ↗

PteranodonS0147 · Malware

ATT&CK S0147 ↗

RemcosS0332 · Tool

ATT&CK S0332 ↗

PowerPunchS0685 · Malware

ATT&CK S0685 ↗

QuietSieveS0686 · Malware

ATT&CK S0686 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0047 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

70 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

9 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.