G0064 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT33

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.

Attributed to Iran — IRGC-aligned by government advisory.⁵⁰

Also tracked as: HOLMIUM Elfin Peach Sandstorm — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Net, ftp, AutoIt backdoor.³⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

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T1003.005 Cached Domain CredentialsCredential Access

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T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1040 Network SniffingCredential Access / Discovery

●

T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolExfiltration

●

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

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T1132.001 Standard EncodingCommand & Control

T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1552.006 Group Policy PreferencesCredential Access

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T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1571 Non-Standard PortCommand & Control

T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

ftpS0095 · Tool

ATT&CK S0095 ↗

AutoIt backdoorS0129 · Malware

ATT&CK S0129 ↗

PupyS0192 · Tool

ATT&CK S0192 ↗

PowerSploitS0194 · Tool

ATT&CK S0194 ↗

NETWIRES0198 · Malware

ATT&CK S0198 ↗

TURNEDUPS0199 · Malware

ATT&CK S0199 ↗

+8 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to G0064 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0064 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0064 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

31 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

16 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

Origin / sponsor (Iran — IRGC-aligned) — curated government advisory (cited)

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.