G0067 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT37

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: InkySquid ScarCruft Reaper Group123 TEMP.Reaper Ricochet Chollima — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 13 tools/malware to this group, including Cobalt Strike, CORALDECK, DOGCALL, HAPPYWORK.³²

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.003 SteganographyDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.001 Invalid Code SignatureDefense Evasion

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

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T1120 Peripheral Device DiscoveryDiscovery

T1123 Audio CaptureCollection

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T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1529 System Shutdown/RebootImpact

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1561.002 Disk Structure WipeImpact

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

Cobalt StrikeS0154 · Malware

ATT&CK S0154 ↗

CORALDECKS0212 · Malware

ATT&CK S0212 ↗

DOGCALLS0213 · Malware

ATT&CK S0213 ↗

HAPPYWORKS0214 · Malware

ATT&CK S0214 ↗

KARAES0215 · Malware

ATT&CK S0215 ↗

POORAIMS0216 · Malware

ATT&CK S0216 ↗

SHUTTERSPEEDS0217 · Malware

ATT&CK S0217 ↗

SLOWDRIFTS0218 · Malware

ATT&CK S0218 ↗

+5 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 13 tools/malware to G0067 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0067 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0067 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

29 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

13 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

6 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.