G0069 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

MuddyWater

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.

Attributed to Iran — MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security) by government advisory.⁷⁶

Also tracked as: Earth Vetala MERCURY Static Kitten Seedworm TEMP.Zagros Mango Sandstorm TA450 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 15 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PowerSploit, POWERSTATS, Koadic.⁶¹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

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T1003.005 Cached Domain CredentialsCredential Access

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T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1027.003 SteganographyDefense Evasion

T1027.004 Compile After DeliveryDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

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T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

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T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1104 Multi-Stage ChannelsCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1132.001 Standard EncodingCommand & Control

T1137.001 Office Template MacrosPersistence

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesLateral Movement

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T1218.003 CMSTPDefense Evasion

T1218.005 MshtaDefense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1219 Remote Access ToolsCommand & Control

T1518 Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1559.001 Component Object ModelExecution

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

PowerSploitS0194 · Tool

ATT&CK S0194 ↗

POWERSTATSS0223 · Malware

KoadicS0250 · Tool

LaZagneS0349 · Tool

EmpireS0363 · Tool

SHARPSTATSS0450 · Malware

ATT&CK S0450 ↗

CrackMapExecS0488 · Tool

ATT&CK S0488 ↗

+7 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 15 tools/malware to G0069 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0069 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0069 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

58 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

15 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

Origin / sponsor (Iran — MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)) — curated government advisory (cited)

13 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.