G0080 Crimewareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Cobalt Group

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: GOLD KINGSWOOD Cobalt Gang Cobalt Spider — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a financially-motivated operator.

A crimeware classification means the objective is money — access brokering, theft, fraud, or commodity malware. Volume and opportunism over stealth; the path tends to monetize fast. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike, SDelete.³⁷

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 3 — Lateral reach — past segmentation. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1037.001 Logon Script (Windows)Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.004 DNSCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply ChainInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218.003 CMSTPDefense Evasion

T1218.008 OdbcconfDefense Evasion

T1218.010 Regsvr32Defense Evasion

T1219 Remote Access ToolsCommand & Control

T1220 XSL Script ProcessingDefense Evasion

T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1572 Protocol TunnelingCommand & Control

T1573.002 Asymmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3 — furthest is 3 · Lateral reach. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

Cobalt StrikeS0154 · Malware

ATT&CK S0154 ↗

SDeleteS0195 · Tool

ATT&CK S0195 ↗

More_eggsS0284 · Malware

ATT&CK S0284 ↗

SpicyOmeletteS0646 · Malware

ATT&CK S0646 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0080 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

34 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

11 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.