G0082 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT38

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: NICKEL GLADSTONE BeagleBoyz Bluenoroff Stardust Chollima Sapphire Sleet COPERNICIUM — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Net, DarkComet, HOPLIGHT.⁵⁹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.003 Rename Legitimate UtilitiesDefense Evasion

T1036.006 Space after FilenameDefense Evasion

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.003 CronExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.006 TimestompDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

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T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1115 Clipboard DataCollection

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T1135 Network Share DiscoveryDiscovery

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1217 Browser Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1218.001 Compiled HTML FileDefense Evasion

T1218.005 MshtaDefense Evasion

T1218.007 MsiexecDefense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1480.002 Mutual ExclusionDefense Evasion

T1485 Data DestructionImpact

●

T1486 Data Encrypted for ImpactImpact

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T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1529 System Shutdown/RebootImpact

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T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web BypassDefense Evasion

T1561.002 Disk Structure WipeImpact

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1562.003 Impair Command History LoggingDefense Evasion

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1562.013 Disable or Modify Network Device FirewallDefense Evasion

T1565.001 Stored Data ManipulationImpact

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T1565.002 Transmitted Data ManipulationImpact

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T1565.003 Runtime Data ManipulationImpact

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1569.002 Service ExecutionExecution

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T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

DarkCometS0334 · Malware

ATT&CK S0334 ↗

HOPLIGHTS0376 · Malware

ATT&CK S0376 ↗

ECCENTRICBANDWAGONS0593 · Malware

ATT&CK S0593 ↗

KillDiskS0607 · Malware

ATT&CK S0607 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0082 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

56 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

8 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.