G0087 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

APT39

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: ITG07 Chafer Remix Kitten — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, pwdump, PsExec.⁵⁶

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003 OS Credential DumpingCredential Access

●

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

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T1021.004 SSHLateral Movement

●

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1056 Input CaptureCredential Access / Collection

●

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1059 Command and Scripting InterpreterExecution

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1059.010 AutoHotKey & AutoITExecution

●

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.004 DNSCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

●

T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1115 Clipboard DataCollection

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T1135 Network Share DiscoveryDiscovery

T1136.001 Local AccountPersistence

●

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

●

T1197 BITS JobsPersistence / Defense Evasion

●

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1546.010 AppInit DLLsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.009 Shortcut ModificationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1553.006 Code Signing Policy ModificationDefense Evasion

T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1569.002 Service ExecutionExecution

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T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

Windows Credential EditorS0005 · Tool

ATT&CK S0005 ↗

pwdumpS0006 · Tool

ATT&CK S0006 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

ASPXSpyS0073 · Malware

ATT&CK S0073 ↗

ftpS0095 · Tool

ATT&CK S0095 ↗

RemexiS0375 · Malware

ATT&CK S0375 ↗

CadelspyS0454 · Malware

ATT&CK S0454 ↗

+3 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to G0087 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0087 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0087 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

53 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

11 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

7 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.