G0092 Ransomwareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

TA505

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Hive0065 Spandex Tempest CHIMBORAZO — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a crew that turns access into an outage.

A ransomware classification means the path is funded to reach disruption and extortion — encryption, data theft for leverage, and downtime. Exposure here is a business-continuity problem, not just a patch ticket. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Net, Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit.³⁷

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1069 Permission Groups DiscoveryDiscovery

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1078.002 Domain AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1087.003 Email AccountDiscovery

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218.007 MsiexecDefense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1486 Data Encrypted for ImpactImpact

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web BypassDefense Evasion

T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1568.001 Fast Flux DNSCommand & Control

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1588.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1608.001 Upload MalwareResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

Cobalt StrikeS0154 · Malware

ATT&CK S0154 ↗

PowerSploitS0194 · Tool

ATT&CK S0194 ↗

TrickBotS0266 · Malware

ATT&CK S0266 ↗

AzorultS0344 · Malware

ATT&CK S0344 ↗

FlawedAmmyyS0381 · Malware

ATT&CK S0381 ↗

ServHelperS0382 · Malware

ATT&CK S0382 ↗

+8 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to G0092 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0092 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0092 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

34 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

16 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

7 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Data at risk — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.