G0093 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

GALLIUM

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers. Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Granite Typhoon — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, PoisonIvy, PlugX.³⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.002 Security Account ManagerCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.005 Indicator Removal from ToolsDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.003 Rename Legitimate UtilitiesDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

●

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

●

T1136.002 Domain AccountPersistence

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

●

T1550.002 Pass the HashDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

●

T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

●

T1570 Lateral Tool TransferLateral Movement

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T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1583.004 ServerResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

Windows Credential EditorS0005 · Tool

ATT&CK S0005 ↗

PoisonIvyS0012 · Malware

ATT&CK S0012 ↗

PlugXS0013 · Malware

ATT&CK S0013 ↗

China ChopperS0020 · Malware

PsExecS0029 · Tool

NetS0039 · Tool

HTRANS0040 · Tool

+8 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 16 tools/malware to G0093 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0093 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0093 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

31 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

16 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

4 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.