G0106 Crimewareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Rocke

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "[email protected]" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a financially-motivated operator.

A crimeware classification means the objective is money — access brokering, theft, fraud, or commodity malware. Volume and opportunism over stealth; the path tends to monetize fast. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1014 RootkitDefense Evasion

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.004 SSHLateral Movement

●

T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.004 Compile After DeliveryDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.003 CronExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1055.002 Portable Executable InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.004 Unix ShellExecution

●

T1059.006 PythonExecution

●

T1070.002 Clear Linux or Mac System LogsDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.006 TimestompDefense Evasion

T1071 Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1102 Web ServiceCommand & Control

T1102.001 Dead Drop ResolverCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

●

T1222.002 Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions ModificationDefense Evasion

T1496.001 Compute HijackingImpact

●

T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1543.002 Systemd ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1552.004 Private KeysCredential Access

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1564.001 Hidden Files and DirectoriesDefense Evasion

T1571 Non-Standard PortCommand & Control

T1574.006 Dynamic Linker HijackingPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

No named arsenalCoverage gap

ATT&CK attributes no software to G0106 at this snapshot. Absence is a finding, not a claim of harmlessness.

ATT&CK G0106 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0106 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

36 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

1 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Data at risk — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.