not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group
Operation Wocao
How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group1: Operation Wocao described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. Operation Wocao targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Operation Wocao used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.
Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.
Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.
A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.
Known for
— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CKTradecraft heatmap
— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narrativesNo techniques are recorded for this group in the ATT&CK snapshot below — the tradecraft heatmap is empty. That is an honest coverage gap (sparse / legacy / revoked group), never a claim that the actor does nothing.1
Arsenal
— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this groupATT&CK attributes no software to G0116 at this snapshot. Absence is a finding, not a claim of harmlessness.
Campaign highlights
— attributed operations in the ATT&CK recordNo attributed campaigns — coverage gap
Latest activity
— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claimsnapshot
The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.