G1004 Ransomwareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

LAPSUS$

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: DEV-0537 Strawberry Tempest — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a crew that turns access into an outage.

A ransomware classification means the path is funded to reach disruption and extortion — encryption, data theft for leverage, and downtime. Exposure here is a business-continuity problem, not just a patch ticket. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 1 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz.⁴⁶

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

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T1003.006 DCSyncCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090 ProxyCommand & Control

T1098.003 Additional Cloud RolesPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionCredential Access

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T1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1136.003 Cloud AccountPersistence

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T1199 Trusted RelationshipInitial Access

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T1204 User ExecutionExecution

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T1213.001 ConfluenceCollection

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T1213.002 SharepointCollection

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T1213.003 Code RepositoriesCollection

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T1213.005 Messaging ApplicationsCollection

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T1485 Data DestructionImpact

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T1489 Service StopImpact

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T1531 Account Access RemovalImpact

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T1552.008 Chat MessagesCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1555.005 Password ManagersCredential Access

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T1578.002 Create Cloud InstanceDefense Evasion

T1578.003 Delete Cloud InstanceDefense Evasion

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1584.002 DNS ServerResource Development

T1586.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1588.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1589 Gather Victim Identity InformationReconnaissance

T1589.001 CredentialsReconnaissance

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1591.002 Business RelationshipsReconnaissance

T1591.004 Identify RolesReconnaissance

T1593.003 Code RepositoriesReconnaissance

T1597.002 Purchase Technical DataReconnaissance

T1598.004 Spearphishing VoiceReconnaissance

T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationCredential Access

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T1656 ImpersonationDefense Evasion

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G1004 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

43 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

1 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

4 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.