G1009 Ransomwareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Moses Staff

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand. Security researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: DEV-0500 Marigold Sandstorm — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a crew that turns access into an outage.

A ransomware classification means the path is funded to reach disruption and extortion — encryption, data theft for leverage, and downtime. Exposure here is a business-continuity problem, not just a patch ticket. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 4 tools/malware to this group, including PsExec, PyDCrypt, DCSrv, StrifeWater.¹⁵

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 3 — Lateral reach — past segmentation. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

●

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

●

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

●

T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3 — furthest is 3 · Lateral reach. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

PyDCryptS1032 · Malware

ATT&CK S1032 ↗

DCSrvS1033 · Malware

ATT&CK S1033 ↗

StrifeWaterS1034 · Malware

ATT&CK S1034 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G1009 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

12 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

4 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

3 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.