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Threats / Actors / Saint Bear
G1031 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s
ATT&CK Group

Saint Bear

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group1: Saint Bear is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, Saint Bot, and information stealer, OutSteel in campaigns. Saint Bear typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities. Saint Bear has previously been confused with Ember Bear…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Storm-0587 TA471 UAC-0056 Lorec53 — ATT&CK group page1
Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

18
Techniques
ATT&CK count1
2
Named tools / malware
ATT&CK count2
0
Attributed campaigns
ATT&CK count1
7
Tactics spanned
ATT&CK count1
coverage gap
Activity bounds
no attributed campaign
01

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK
ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 2 tools/malware to this group, including OutSteel, Saint Bot.21
ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 2 — Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).
02

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2 — furthest is 2 · Keys to the kingdom. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.
Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.1
03

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group
OutSteelS1017 · Malware
Saint BotS1018 · Malware
04

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record
?

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden
ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G1031 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.
05

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim
ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted
CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.
06

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page
  • 18 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)
  • 2 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages
  • 2 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.
  • Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.
  • Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.
  • Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.
  • ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.
  • No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.
  • Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.