G1039 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

RedCurl

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks. RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor. The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1020 Automated ExfiltrationExfiltration

●

T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1039 Data from Network Shared DriveCollection

●

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1056.002 GUI Input CaptureCredential Access / Collection

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1080 Taint Shared ContentLateral Movement

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1087.003 Email AccountDiscovery

T1102 Web ServiceCommand & Control

T1114.001 Local Email CollectionCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1199 Trusted RelationshipInitial Access

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T1202 Indirect Command ExecutionDefense Evasion

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud AccountExfiltration

●

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1552.002 Credentials in RegistryCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1564.001 Hidden Files and DirectoriesDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

●

T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1573.002 Asymmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

No named arsenalCoverage gap

ATT&CK attributes no software to G1039 at this snapshot. Absence is a finding, not a claim of harmlessness.

ATT&CK G1039 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G1039 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

41 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

2 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.