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Threats / Arm / CVE-2021-27562
CVE-2021-27562 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Arm Trusted Firmware vulnerability

Arm Trusted Firmware contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability (CWE-787) in the non-secure processing environment handler that allows attackers to trigger system halt, overwrite secure data, or leak sensitive information.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An out-of-bounds write in Arm Trusted Firmware's NSPE handler permits non-secure code to corrupt secure memory, halt the system, or exfiltrate protected data. Active exploitation in the wild demonstrates practical attack feasibility.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033EPSS 0.03093 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.03093 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Arm, Trusted Firmware. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write — weakness family: Memory safety.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-787 · Out-of-bounds WriteMemory safety
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I execute untrusted code in the non-secure world and invoke secure functions through the NSPE handler.
Business
System availability is compromised through denial-of-service halts triggered from unprivileged execution contexts.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft malicious non-secure function calls that write out-of-bounds into secure memory regions.
Business
Confidentiality and integrity of secure firmware and cryptographic keys are breached, undermining the trusted execution environment.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I leverage the out-of-bounds write to read and exfiltrate secure data stored in protected memory.
Business
Sensitive authentication credentials and security-critical data are exposed to attackers with non-secure access.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 5 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.