Threats / Apache / CVE-2022-33891
CVE-2022-33891
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
Apache Spark vulnerability
Apache Spark contains a command injection vulnerability in its User Interface when Access Control Lists are enabled, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
A command injection flaw in Apache Spark's UI permits remote code execution when ACLs are configured. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild with high exploit probability, posing immediate risk to Spark deployments.
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreExploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
333 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2023-03-07).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.92984 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Apache, Spark. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I craft a malicious input to the Spark UI that bypasses ACL validation and injects shell commands.
Business
Attacker gains arbitrary code execution on systems running Spark, enabling data theft, lateral movement, or infrastructure compromise.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I execute system commands through the injected payload to establish persistence or escalate privileges within the cluster.
Business
Operational continuity is disrupted; sensitive data processed by Spark becomes accessible to unauthorized parties.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I pivot to connected systems and data repositories accessible from the compromised Spark node.
Business
Breach scope expands beyond Spark to dependent applications and data stores, multiplying incident response costs and regulatory exposure.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05
Coverage & confidence
— what we know, and what we don’tEstablished (cited)
Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden
Disclosure & credit2
Catalogued by apacheCNA
Credited with finding itKostya Kortchinsky (Databricks)unspecified