Threats / Atlassian / CVE-2023-22527
CVE-2023-22527
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
Atlassian Confluence Data Center and Server vulnerability
Atlassian Confluence Data Center and Server are vulnerable to unauthenticated OGNL template injection leading to remote code execution. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild and associated with ransomware campaigns.
Verdict
Today item, not a backlog item.
An unauthenticated attacker can inject malicious OGNL expressions into Confluence templates to achieve arbitrary code execution on affected systems. This critical vulnerability has been weaponized in active ransomware operations.
CISA KEV Yes · 2024-01-243Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.99984 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreExploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
942 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-01-24), flagged for known ransomware use.
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99984 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Atlassian, Confluence Data Center and Server. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-74 CWE-74 — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I identify a publicly accessible Confluence instance without authentication requirements for template processing.
Business
Confluence deployments are exposed to internet-facing attack surface without credential barriers.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I craft and submit malicious OGNL expressions through template injection points to bypass expression language restrictions.
Business
Template processing logic fails to sanitize or restrict dangerous expression evaluation.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I execute arbitrary system commands on the server through OGNL evaluation to establish persistence and lateral movement.
Business
Attackers gain full code execution capability within the Confluence application context.
4
Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4
Attacker
I deploy ransomware payloads or exfiltrate sensitive documentation and collaboration data stored in Confluence.
Business
Critical business data is encrypted or stolen; operations are disrupted and ransom demands are issued.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05
Coverage & confidence
— what we know, and what we don’tEstablished (cited)
Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden
Disclosure & credit2
Catalogued by atlassianCNA
Credited with finding itPetrus Vietunspecified