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Threats / ScienceLogic / CVE-2024-9537
CVE-2024-9537 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

ScienceLogic SL1 vulnerability

ScienceLogic SL1 contains an unspecified vulnerability in a third-party component. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild with a moderate EPSS score of 0.64.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unspecified third-party component vulnerability in ScienceLogic SL1 poses active exploitation risk. Organizations running SL1 should prioritize patching and monitoring for compromise indicators given confirmed wild exploitation.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-10-213EPSS 0.03852 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-10-21).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.03852 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: ScienceLogic, SL1. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify and target the vulnerable third-party component within SL1 deployments.
Business
Monitoring infrastructure becomes compromised, creating blind spots in IT operations visibility.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I exploit the unspecified vulnerability to gain initial access to the SL1 platform.
Business
Attackers obtain credentials and access to centralized monitoring systems managing critical infrastructure.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I leverage SL1 access to move laterally across monitored systems and networks.
Business
Operational technology and IT environments become exposed to lateral movement and further compromise.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 3 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • Catalogued by cisa-cg (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by cisa-cgCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.